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Kadic v. Karadzic-Rape as a Crime
Against Women as a Class
Rumna Chowdhury*
"A nation is not conquered until the hearts of its women are on
the ground. Then it is done, no matter how strong the
weapons, or how brave the warriors."1
"Not since the soldiersput a long thick rifle inside me. So cold,
the steel rod canceling my heart. Don't know whether they're
going to fire it or shove it through my spinning brain. Six of
them, monstrous doctors with black masks shoving bottles up
me too. There were sticks, and the end of a broom. 2
I.

Introduction

You have just been raped. Scared, hurt, and confused, you
turn to your mother, your best friend, your partner; together they
help you to get the medical and emotional attention you need.
* J.D. expected 2002, University of Minnesota. B.S. 1999, University of Wisconsin.
I would like to thank Nicole Forkenbrock Lindemyer for her brilliant ideas,
feedback, and friendship, without which this paper would not have come into being.
For their comments on pervious drafts of this article, I would also like to thank
Benjamin Felcher, Heather Redmond, Lori Romeyn Sitowski, and Kathryn
Strobach. Finally, I am forever grateful to David Dinsmoor, my parents, and my
family for their enduring love and support.
During the course of my research and writing of this article, I have had many
interesting discussions with various acquaintances and colleagues. Most people are
stunned when I tell them I have spent so much time working on a project
surrounding the recognition of rape as genocide. I have heard many comments
about my topic being "intense," a downer," and "not very pleasant." To say this
topic is unpleasant is an insulting understatement that can be made only by those
who have the privilege of being able to turn the page and forget about such
"unpleasant" matters. But much of the world does not have that privilege. I do not
know a single woman with the privilege of not having to think about rape, whether
dealing with its direct consequences or designing a plan to protect herself. I
implore you to read the vile details of the sexual violence committed against
Bosnian women. Then close this article and pick up another. Make it your
business to know the horror that thousands of women live through-it is the least
you can do. If you are disgusted, do not turn away, but take action on behalf of
those who do not have the luxury of turning the page and returning to a violencefree life.

1. In~s Hernandez-Avila, In Praise of Insubordination, Or, What Makes a
Good Woman Go Bad?, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE 375, 375 (Emilie
Buchwald et al. eds., 1993).
2. EvE ENSLER, THE VAGINA MONOLOGUES 58 (1998).
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With a support network of friends and family, you are able to heal
and cope, to go on with your life.3 Now move yourself to another
city, another state, another country. You have just been raped.
Scared, hurt, and confused, you want to turn to your mother, but a
soldier killed her two weeks ago. You try turning to your best
friend, but she, too, was just raped, and the trauma from her own
attack renders her helpless to support you. You turn to your
partner, but he rejects you because you have betrayed him by
4
being intimate (although not by choice) with another man. You
have just been raped, as have all the women around you, and yet
you are completely alone, isolated from any personal support, and
alienated from your entire community.
When all of a community's women are attacked, the
community eventually disintegrates. The epidemic trauma and
violent victimization of rape 5 go to the heart of the community and
destroy its very unity. The strategic mass rape of women was a
very powerful tool of war used to destroy the Bosnian people in the
6
former Yugoslavia.
Across times and cultures, violence against women has been
a widespread and socially accepted phenomenon. 7 Unfortunately,
3. This is, of course, an idealized and exceptional view of the community
response to a rape survivor, which draws on many Western standards and
institutions.
Women in communities with increased education about sexual
violence, its causes, and its impact on the victim/survivor are more likely to receive
acceptance and treatment from their communities.
4. See generally Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in
InternationalLaw, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 326, 329-30 (1994) (discussing and describing
various societal reactions to sexual abuse).
5. A note on terminology: the term "sexual violence" is generally used to refer
to any violence motivated by gender or violence of a sexual nature; whereas, "rape"
refers to the specific act of bodily penetration by a foreign object. Neither term
used alone is ideal for this Note: "rape" is not defined broadly enough to encompass
all of the violence discussed, and "sexual violence" is used as a euphemism for rape,
making it sound like a less serious crime. Thus, both terms will be used
interchangeably, to remind the reader of the broad spectrum of bodily violations
being discussed (sexual violence) while retaining the horror and discomfort
associated with any real discussion of those violations (rape).
6. See Brenda Smiley, Rape Tore the Fabric of Bosnian Families, Society,
WOMEN'S ENEWS (Aug. 11, 2000) (summarizing the Kadic case and decision,
including statements by psychiatrist Mladen Loncar, who testified on the lasting
effects for the individual victim and the greater community, as well as the use of
rape
as
a
devastating
weapon
of
war),
at
http://www.womensenews.comlarticle.cfin/dyn/aid/231/context.archive.
7. See generally Valerie Smith, Split Affinities: The Case of InterracialRape,
in THEORIZING FEMINISM: PARALLEL TRENDS IN THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL

SCIENCES 155 (Anne C. Hermann & Abigail J. Stewart eds., 1994) (discussing the
intersection between race and sexuality, including the rape of slave women in the
United States to increase the property of their "master"); ALICE WALKER &
PRATIBRA PARMAR, WARRIOR MARKS (1993) (discussing the historical and present-
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many people still find such behavior not only acceptable, but also
useful, in their assertions of power and control over women. 8 Over
centuries of struggle, proponents of women's rights have made
significant gains in the fight for the social and legal equality of
women, including official condemnation of crimes against women. 9
One central aspect of this struggle is public recognition of the
validity of the feminist adage, "[t]he personal is political."'10
Historically, women have been relegated to the private spheres of
the home, the bedroom, and the kitchen, with the law refusing to
penetrate the "veil of privacy.""
This refusal effectively
immunized actors who violated women in their socially-accepted
12
private roles.
Indeed, even as women have entered the public arena of the
workplace en masse, their bodies have retained the stigma of
privacy; crimes committed against women, even outside the
private sphere of the home, are not considered matters of proper
public concern. 13
In this way, the public/private dichotomy
operates to preclude redress for crimes against women, and as
such, "private" offenses are not subject to the public scrutiny of the
law. Obliteration of the public/private distinction of offenses and
actors is therefore essential to recognizing that violence against
women is, in fact, a matter of profound public importance. The
civil and criminal actions 14 against Radovan Karadzic, the

day prevalence of female genital mutilation); ROOT OF BITTERNESS: DOCUMENTS OF
THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN (Nancy F. Cott et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996)
[hereinafter ROOT OF BITTERNESS] (discussing various historical struggles of
American women, including rape, regulation of women's bodies, slavery, health,
marriage, and persecution for witchcraft).
8. See sources cited supra note 7.
9. See generally ROOT OF BITTERNESS, supra note 7 (discussing the evolution of
women's rights and history).
10. GLORIA STEINEM, THE WISDOM OF WOMEN 47 (Carol Spenard LaRusso ed.,
1992).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. This Note focuses on one civil action against Karadzic. More information on
the criminal actions against him is available from a variety of sources. See
generally Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The InternationalCriminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 360 (1994) (outlining principles of
jurisdiction and procedure of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia);
Paul J. Mangarella, The Conflicts of the Former Yugoslavia in the Courts, 14
ANTHROPOLOGY OF E. EUR. REV. 44 (1996) (discussing both the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the civil actions against Karadzic
in the United States). For updates, see the United Nations website for the
international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at http://www.un.orglicty/
(last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
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"Heinrich Himmiler" of the Balkans 15 who orchestrated the
genocidal rape of thousands of Bosnian women, represent a
monumental step forward in dismantling this pernicious
dichotomy.
This Note focuses on the importance of Kadic v. Karadzic,16 a
civil action brought by survivors of genocidal rape orchestrated
under Karadzic's command. In the summer of 2000, after seven
years of litigation, the trial culminated in a jury verdict of $745
million in compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiff
women and children refugees of Bosnia-Herzegovina.17 The Kadic
decision has profound significance both in conceptualizing rape as
a tool of torture and genocide within the norms of international
human rights law18 and in expanding the opportunity of genocide

15. See Warren Zimmerman, Impressions of Karadzic, in FRONTLINE ONLINE:
at
WANTED
MAN,
WORLD'S
MOST
THE

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/radovan/impressions.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 2001). Zimmerman, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia,
describes Karadzic as a "man obsessed by the imagery of violence," who is mad, and
"seemed to [be] a man who needed psychiatric care, a person without moral
compass or restraint." Id.
16. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (opening the door for the jury award by reversing
the dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and remanding to district
court). From the start, the Kadic action was an uphill battle for the plaintiffs. A
series of cases provide the full procedural history. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 192
F.R.D. 133 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2000) (granting Kadic plaintiffs' motion to decertify
plaintiff class); Doe v. Karadzic, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1999)
(denying Kadic plaintiffs' motion to reconsider motion to certify for interlocutory
appeal); Doe v. Karadzic, 182 F.R.D. 424 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1998) (denying Kadic
plaintiffs' motion to opt out of class); Kadic v. Karadzic, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19130 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997) (affirming previous discovery orders); Doe v.
Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1997) (granting Doe plaintiffs' motion to
amend and certify as a class); Kadic v. Karadzic, 1997 'U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1997) (finding defendant must appear in the United States for
deposition and must supplement discovery responses); Karadzic v. Kadic, 518 U.S.
1005 (June 17, 1996) (denying certiorari to decide issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction); Kadic v. Karadzic, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5291 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22,
1996) (finding service was proper, denying defendant motion to stay proceedings
pending Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari); Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377
(2d Cir. Jan. 6, 1996) (denying rehearing motion by defendant to reconsider
appellate court reversal of district court dismissal); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232
(2d Cir. Oct. 13, 1995) (reversing district court decision to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and remanding to district court); Kadic v. Karadzic, 866
F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1994) (dismissing action for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction); Kadic v. Karadzic, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13428 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23,
1993) (granting defendant extension to prepare motion to dismiss).
17. See John Sullivan, American Justice Tackles Rights Abuses Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2000, at 4.
18. The criminal component of this action, which is in the form of indictments
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia against several
former Bosnian-Serb political and military leaders, including Radovan Karadzic,
has been noted as "the first United Nations trial ever to focus exclusively on sexual
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victims to sue for damages under the United States Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA).19 This Note discusses not only the expansion
of the ATCA to apply to non-state actors, 20 but also the
significance of the Kadic action within the greater arena of
women's international human rights.
Specifically, this Note
demonstrates how Kadic signifies that violence against women can
no longer be dismissed as a private offense against an individual
woman, but rather must be acknowledged as a crime against
women as a class--one with enormous public consequences.
Part II of this Note outlines the ways in which society has
attempted to justify the blatant disregard for issues significant to
women by relegating those issues to the private realm, thereby
making them improper subjects for societal or governmental
scrutiny. 21 This section illustrates the dwindling strength of the
distinction between public and private and the subsequent benefit
to the enforcement of women's international human rights. 22 Part
III lays out developments in U.S. international law that allowed
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over Karadzic, a foreign

violence against women, including gang rape and the use of women as sexual slaves
as part of a war strategy." Marlise Simons, Tribunal Gains Steam as It Tries
Balkan Horrors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at Al. Systematic sexual abuse of
women during times of conflict has traditionally been ignored. See generally
Chinkin, supra note 4 (discussing and describing various societal reactions to
sexual abuse); Sarnata Reynolds, Deterring and Preventing Rape and Sexual
Slavery During Periodsof Armed Conflict, 16 LAW & INEQ. 601 (1998) (discussing
the prevalence of rape and sexual slavery during times of armed conflict and tactics
available to eliminate such violence).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994); see also Lawrence Newman & Michael Burrows,
InternationalLitigation: The Alien Tort Claims Act, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1995, at 3
(asserting that the Second Circuit is the first contemporary court to approve
subject-matter jurisdiction for a non-state actor under the ATCA). See generally
Alan F. Enslen, Filartiga's Offspring: The Second Circuit Significantly Expands the
Scope of the Alien Tort Claim Act with its Decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 48 ALA. L.
REV. 695 (1997) (discussing the expansion of the ATCA, which has taken place as a
result of the Kadic decision). 'The Kadic decision significantly expands the scope of
the ATCA because it extends the reach of the statute to include certain tortious
acts committed by non-state actors." Id. at 696. Enslen analyzes in great depth the
impact of the 1995 appellate court decision that subject-matter jurisdiction was
proper under the ATCA and its potential meaning to future ATCA litigation. See
id. at 695-735.
20. A non-state actor is a private individual whose actions are not tied to a
particular state. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40, 245. A state actor, on the other
hand, is an individual whose conduct could be tied to a sovereign entity. See id. at
244. Somewhere between the two is a colorable state actor, who is an individual
acting in conjunction with a state or with a state's significant assistance. See id. at
245.
21. See infra notes 29-103 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 29-103 and accompanying text.
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citizen. 23 Karadzic claimed that he could not be held accountable
for his actions under the ATCA because he was not acting as an
official state actor. 24 The Second Circuit, determining the farreaching effects of "private" actions into the public arena, found
that this defense no longer exists and that jurisdiction over
Karadzic was proper. 25 Part IV further discusses the public effects
of "private" actions by "private" citizens, detailing the atrocities
orchestrated by Karadzic in the former Yugoslavia. 26 This Part
also analyzes the civil actions against Karadzic and their effect on
ATCA jurisprudence. 27 Part V concludes that the civil actions
against Radovan Karadzic are a significant step forward in
breaking down the public/private dichotomy, which in turn
28
profoundly impacts the concept of women's human rights.
II. The Role of the Public/Private Dichotomy in Women's
Rights
A. How the Dichotomy Operates to Justify Acceptance of
Violence Against Women
Feminist theorists assert that the public/private dichotomy
works to oppress women by relegating them to the private sphere,
The Cult of True
outside the realm of traditional law. 29
Womanhood 30 is one feminist theory explaining the evolution of
the public/private dichotomy. 31 Upon industrialization and mass

23. See infra notes 104-134 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 104-134 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 104-134 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 135-198 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 135-198 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
29. See generally Rebecca Cook, Accountability in International Law for
Violations of Women's Rights by Non-state Actors, in RECONCEIVING REALITY:
WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993) (opining
that parties should be held accountable for both public and "private" violence
against women); Shelley Wright, Economic Rights, Social Justice and the State: A
Feminist Reappraisal, in RECONCEIVING

REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW 117 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993) (discussing the development of human
rights as the development of only men's rights); Karen Engle, After the Collapse of
the Public/Private Distinction: Strategizing Women's Rights, in RECONCEIVING
REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993)
(critiquing the public/private dichotomy in international law).
30. Also commonly referred to as the "Cult of Domesticity" or the "Cult of the
Lady."
31. For an in-depth discussion of the Cult of True Womanhood, see BARBARA
WELTER, The Cult of True Womanhood 1820-1860, in DIMITY CONVIcTIONS: THE
AMERICAN WOMAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 21 (1976).
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movement from rural to metropolitan areas, many men entered
the workforce outside the home, leaving women in the private,
domestic sphere. 32 This was a change from the traditional notion
of men's work, which was within the homestead and alongside
women.3 3 As the difference in the division of labor became more
pronounced, the work of women in the private sphere became
34
devalued.
The cardinal values that society used to judge a woman as a
and
piety, purity, submissiveness,
True Woman were
domesticity. 35 The ability of a woman to complete her work
unseen and in silence became an asset, an extension of the value of
submissiveness, because it boosted the ego of the male
breadwinner. 36 Valuing women who fit into the Cult of True
Womanhood led to a dichotomy between the "True Woman," who
stayed in the private realm, and other, inferior women, who
appeared publicly. A woman's proper place in society was as a
mother, daughter, sister, or wife. 37 Any woman assuming an
alternate role, such as working outside the home, was considered
neither a real woman nor a True Woman, because she presented
herself in public and worked publicly, like a man. 38 A woman
working in the public realm was essentially a prostitute, trading
her Womanhood for money.
The negative attitude towards women in the public sphere
39
prompted mistreatment and discrimination against them.
Present-day examples of this oppression manifest themselves in
the form of violence against women who take on roles in the public
sphere. 40 Domestic violence, rape, and sexual harassment are all
societal means of communicating to women that they do not belong
in the public realm and that a woman's proper place is within the

32. See BARBARA ROGERS, THE DOMESTICATION OF WOMEN: DISCRIMINATION IN
DEVELOPING SOCIETIES 22 (1979).
33. See Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, "A Friendly Neighbor'" Social Dimensions of
Daily Work in Northern Colonial New England, in WOMEN AND POWER IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 37, 39 (Kathryn Kish Sklar & Thomas Dublin eds., 1991).
34. See ROGERS, supranote 32, at 14.
35. See WELTER, supra note 31, at 21.
36. See id. at 29.
37. See id. at 21.
38. See id.
39. See ROGERS, supra note 32, at 24-26.
40. See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING

WOMEN (1979) (asserting that sexual harassment in the workplace is a tool used by
men to express their disdain of women in the workforce and to attempt to send
women back to their homes).
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home.41

The situation became such that the only proper ways for a
True Woman to present herself in the public realm were either at
a man's side or as an advocate for a traditionally acceptable
cause. 42 It is ironic that women in the political arena often
advocate for the rights of others rather than participate in
campaigns to enhance their own rights. 43 Until recently, women
remained absent from the most obviously "public" fields of politics,
law, and government. 44 The remnant effects of the Cult of True
Womanhood include the continuing attitude that a woman's
proper place is in the private sphere. The scope of traditional law
must expand to the "private" sphere, where most violence against
women is perpetrated. This is the only way to erase the
public/private distinction and end violence against women.
B. Exclusion of Women From the Development of
InternationalHuman Rights Laws and Standards
Women have been, and still are, systematically excluded from
public discourse on laws and humanitarian standards. This
exclusion led to the absence of women's voices and experiences in
the creation of what essentially became standards for the rights of
men.
Originally, human rights standards did not include
prohibitions against sexual violence, arguably because the
majority of human rights standards and laws were created by
45
men, to whom sexual violence was not a major concern.
41. See id.
42. A traditionally acceptable cause was generally one from which the woman
herself did not directly benefit. See SHEILA TOBIAS, FACES OF FEMINISM: AN
ACTIVIST'S REFLECTIONS ON THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 11 (1997) (citing examples of

movements in which women have been involved, including temperance and antislavery).
43. See id. Women such as Mary Wollstonecraft, Frances Wright, and Harriet
Martineau were condemned for their controversial politics forwarding the rights of
women and met a strong backlash from True Women. See WELTER, supra note 31,
at 40.

44. See Virginia Sapiro, Feminist Studies and Political Science-And Vice
Versa, in FEMINISMS IN THE ACADEMY 291, 294-97 (Donna C. Stanton & Abigail J.
Stewart eds., 1995).
45. See Charlotte Bunch, Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist
Perspective, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS,

HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST

PERSPECTIVES 11, 13 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) (arguing that many
of the experiences of women were not considered human rights violations because
men formulated the concept of international human rights, using definitions based
only upon those acts men feared); see also Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, Sex,
Culture, and Rights: A Re/Conceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First
Century, 60 ALB. L. REV. 607, 610-11 (1997) (noting that excluding women from
participation in the creation of international human rights law resulted in a
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Feminist arguments that international law and human rights
theories do not protect women's needs because they are not truly
universal generally take two forms. 46 Advocates of the first
approach argue that "because international law excludes from its
scope the private, or domestic, sphere-presumably the space in
which women operate-it cannot include them." 47 In order to
protect the particular legal claims made exclusively or chiefly by
women, the world community must reconceptualize international
law to include the private sphere. 48 Advocates of the second
approach argue that international law intentionally uses the
public/private divide to conveniently avoid addressing issues of
specific concern to women. 49 These advocates also charge that
states do not hesitate to arbitrarily enter the private realm to
regulate private family matters and to end "private" violence that
takes the form of cannibalism or slavery; yet, they refuse to enter
that same realm to protect women from "private" gender-based
violence. 50
The distinction between the two approaches is important
because the second theory charges that the exclusion of women is
intentional. 51 Recognizing this intentional exclusion is essential if
international law is to remedy its lack of protection for women.
Only by such recognition will the international community be able
to adequately address the use of sexual violence against women by
armed forces during times of conflict.
C. Recognizing Rape as a "Public"Crime Against Women
Feminist scholars have long recognized sexual violence as a
52
tool used by men to manipulate and control women through fear.
general dismissal of gender-based abuses from public condemnation).
46. See Engle, supra note 29, at 143; see also Andrew Byrnes, Women,
Feminism and International Human Rights Law--Methodological Myopia,
Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful Marginalization,12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 205
(1992) (discussing similar discourse regarding the public/private distinction).
47. Engle, supra note 29, at 143.
48. See id. at 143-44.
49. See id. at 143.
50. See id. at 144.
51. See generally Hilary Charlesworth, The Public/PrivateDistinction and the
Right to Development in InternationalLaw, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 190 (1992).
Charlesworth maintains that "the division into public and private spheres is not a
simple, monolithic construction," id. at 191, while also arguing that "[t]he operation
of the public/private distinction in international law is one reason why gender has
not been an issue in international law," id. at 203.
52. See generally SuSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (1975) (discussing
the history of rape). Domestic violence and sexual harassment of women in the
workforce are also recognized as abuses against women with the purpose of keeping
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In fact, some assert that rape, identified by psychologists as "the
most intrusive of traumatic events,"53 itself constitutes a war
against women.54 Internationally, there is a long history of rape
and violent sexual abuse of women during times of armed
conflict. 55 From the founding of the city of Rome 56 to the Gulf
58
War, 57 history is replete with examples of such violence.
women "intheir place." See generally MACKINNON, supra note 40 (asserting that
sexual harassment in the workplace is a tool used by men to express their disdain
of women in the workforce and to attempt to send women back to their homes).
53. UNICEF, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War, in THE STATE OF THE
(last
WORLD'S CHILDREN (1996), http://www.unicef.org/sowc96pklsexviol.htm
visited Nov. 19, 2001).
54. Andrea Dworkin, asserting that rape is a war against women, declared to
an audience of 500 men:
I want one day of respite, one day off, one day in which no new bodies are
piled up, one day in which no new agony is added to the old, and I am
asking you to give it to me. And how could I ask you for less--it is so little.
And how could you offer me less: it is so little. Even in wars, there are
days of truce. Go and organize a truce. Stop your side for one day. I want
a twenty-four-hour truce during which there is no rape.
Andrea Dworkin, I Want a Twenty-Four-Hour Truce, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE
CULTURE 13, 21 (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., 1993).
55. See generally BROWNMILLER, supra note 52 (discussing sexual violence
against women in various historical conflicts, from the American Revolution to the
Vietnam War); MIDDLE EAST WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A VICTORY TURNED
SOUR, HUMAN RIGHTS IN KUWAIT SINCE LIBERATION (1991) (discussing the rape of
5000 Kuwaiti women by Iraqi soldiers during the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait);
AFRICA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RWANDA, TALKING PEACE AND WAGING
WAR: HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE THE OCTOBER 1990 INVASION (1992) (discussing the
rape of Rwandan women during the Rwandan civil war); ASIA WATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES IN KASHMIR: A PATTERN OF IMPUNITY
(1993) (discussing incidences of rape and murder by Indian soldiers against women
in Kashmir); AMERICAS WATCH AND THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, UNTOLD TERROR: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN PERU'S ARMED
CONFLICT (1992) (discussing the systematic rape and murder of women in Peru by
men on both sides of the conflict); Mark Huband, Where There Are Any Little Girls
They Should Be Raped,' THE GUARDIAN, May 21, 1993, at 12 (discussing the rape
and ethnic violence committed against Liberian women during civil war); Robert
McCrum, Mass Resistance, THE GUARDIAN WEEKEND, Feb. 19, 1994, at 24
(discussing violence against the women of East Timor since the occupation by
Indonesia).
56. See Donna Macnamara et al., History of Sexual Violence, in
INTERACTIVETHEATRE.ORG, at http://www.interactivetheatre.org/resc/history.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
57. See MIDDLE EAST WATCH, supra note 55.
58. However, it is only recently that such violence is acknowledged as a weapon
of war. The use of sexual violence against women as a weapon of war has been
recognized not just in the case of Bosnia, but also in East Timor, see Seth Mydans,
Sexual Violence as Tool of War: PatternEmerging in East Timor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 2001, at Al C'Investigators say it has become clear that the crimes of the
Indonesian military and the local militias it commanded... include not only
massacres, widespread destruction and mass deportations but also rape and sexual
slavery on a wide and possibly systematic scale.") and Sierra Leone, see HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, SEXUAL VIOLENCE WITHIN THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT (2001)
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The repercussions of rape for an individual woman may last
far beyond the actual attack or attacks, often affecting her for the
rest of her life. 59 Beyond the physical pain and degradation, fear
remains long after an attack. 60 For those who survive an attack,
there is the risk of sexually transmitted diseases and infections,
infertility, and pregnancy, 6' in addition to other physical and
psychological disorders. 62 Pregnancy poses a particular problem
because it forces women to face the possibility that they may bear
their attacker's child. 63 People from the woman's own community
may see her child as proof of her immoral behavior and, in the case
of rape committed by enemy forces, collaboration with that
enemy. 64 Abortion is often not an option because of scarce medical
resources or strict religious teachings. 65 In some communities,
infertility, disease, and loss of virginity leave women
unmarriageable. 66 Many women commit suicide because they are
unable to bear the trauma and shame associated with their
67
attack.
The effects of rape likewise reach beyond the individual
woman attacked and undermine the well-being and security of her
family and community. 68 In addition to the basic medical care
needed following a violent attack, a woman facing disease or
pregnancy will require additional medical attention, which may
place a strain on an already ailing community. 69 Psychological
trauma may move beyond the individual to affect spouses, parents,
C'Throughout the nine year Sierra Leonean conflict there has been widespread and
systematic sexual violence against women and girls including individual and gang
rape, sexual assault with objects such as firewood, umbrellas and sticks, and sexual
For
slavery."), at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africasl-bck0226.htm.
additional examples, see supra note 55.
59. See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 329.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 330.
62. See id. at 330 n.26 (citing M. Belic & V. Kesic, Interim Report, CENTRE FOR
WOMEN WAR VICTIMS (1993) C'In our work, in addition to psychological
disturbances, depression.., we have noticed many psychosomatic and secondary
syndromes and illness. All sorts of tumors, bronchitis, epileptic attacks, anorexia,
and similar illnesses seem to occur more often than would be normal.")).
63. See id. at 330.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 329; see also Adrien Katherine Wing & Sylke Merchan, Rape,
Ethnicity, and Culture Spirit Injury from Bosnia to Black America, 25 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1993) (discussing "spirit injury" to individuals and
communities within the former Yugoslavia).
69. See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 330.
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and children. 70 Oftentimes, "[t]he harm inflicted... on a woman
by a rapist is an attack on her family and culture, as in many
societies women are viewed as repositories of a community's
cultural and spiritual values." 71 A traumatized individual may not
be able to fulfill her obligations to her family or community,
resulting in a gradual halting of everyday activities. 72 Shame that
often leads to suicide or exile (whether forced by the community or
voluntary) leaves children without mothers and leaves the
such a
community in a more advanced state of trauma:
community has to face not only the attack of its women, but their
absence as well. 73 To compound this devastation, the fear that a
woman feels after an attack spreads to other women in the
community who were not personally attacked but who are aware
74
that they may be the next target.
The effects of sexual violence on both individual women and
on their communities are not an incidental byproduct of the
violence of war. On the contrary, the effects of sexual violence are
precisely the purpose for the violence, because it causes
widespread fear and trauma. Sexual violence is used not only to
control and manipulate individual women, but also to exert power
over entire communities, as was the case in the former
Yugoslavia. 75 Law professor Christine Chinkin writes:
[R]ape in war is not merely a matter of chance, of women
victims being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Nor is it a
question of sex. It is rather a question of power and control
which is structured by male soldiers' notions of their
masculine privilege, by the strength of the military's lines of
command and by class and ethnic inequalities among
women.76

Sexual violence during times of armed conflict forwards the goal of
having power and control over individual women as well as entire
communities. Recognition of the widespread community effects of
violence against women is crucial to disassembling the
public/private dichotomy. Because the effects of sexual violence
are not simply private, the crime is also not simply private, and
therefore deserves public attention.
70. See id.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

UNICEF, supra note 53.
See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 330.
See id.; Wing & Merchan, supra note 68, at 24-25.
See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 330.
See id.
Id. at 328 (citing in part to Cynthia Enloe, The Gendered Gulf, in THE "NEw

WORLD ORDER" AT HOME AND ABROAD COLLATERAL DAMAGE 93, 97 (C. Peters ed.,

1992)) (internal citations omitted).
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Special
United
Nations
Radhika
Coomaraswamy,
Rapporteur 77 on Violence Against Women, identifies several
78
reasons for sexual violence against women during armed conflict.
Coomaraswamy maintains that violence against an individual
woman may be directed towards her social group because "to rape
a woman is to humiliate her community." 79 The raping of women
in a community is a declaration to the men of that community that
they have been defeated, for they have failed at their most basic
80
task: to ostensibly protect "their" women.
Law professor Catharine MacKinnon makes the assertion
that the systematic sexual violence against women during the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia would not have happened unless
rape was acceptable as an everyday phenomenon. 8' She notes:
One result is that these rapes are not grasped either as a
strategy in genocide or as a practice of misogyny, far less as
both at once. What is happening to Bosnian and Croatian
women at the hands of the Serbian forces is continuous both
with this ethnic war of aggression and with the gendered war
of aggression of everyday life. For most women, this is to
everyday rape what the Holocaust was to everyday antiSemitism: without the everyday, you could not have the
82
conflagration ....
This acceptance of everyday rape and its relegation to the
"private" realm allow for the use of rape as a tool of war while
maintaining the private categorization and avoidance of liability
for egregious violence against women. The Kadic action, which
held Karadzic liable for his ordered violence against women, is an
83
example of the removal of rape from its private categorization.
Rape is not a private crime against individual women; rather,
it is a crime committed against women as a class. The sheer
number of women who are sexually violated every year supports
77. A special rapporteur is an expert appointed by the United Nations to
investigate specific topics or situations in particular countries. See WEISSBRODT ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 533 (3d ed. 2001).
A special rapporteur "collect[s] information on human rights violations and
prepare[s] annual reports to the Commission [on Human Rights], and if requested,
to the General Assembly." Id. at 238.
78. See Radhika Coomaraswamy, Of Kali Born: Violence and the Law in Sri
Lanka, in FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE: WOMEN'S STRATEGIES FROM AROUND THE
WORLD 49 (Margaret Schuler ed., 1992).

79. Id. at 50.
80. See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 330.
81. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Comment: "Theory is not a Luxury," in
RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 83, 87 (Dorinda G.

Dallmeyer ed., 1993).
82. Id.
83. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 20:91

this argument.8 4
Having considered the "public" effects of
"private" sexual violence, it is clear that rape is a problem that
deserves much more attention than it has traditionally received.
D. InternationalMeasures Addressing Violence Against
Women
The failure to prosecute sexual crimes against women during
the Nuremberg trials following the Second World War reflects the
world's historical tendency to overlook or intentionally ignore
atrocious crimes committed against women.8 5 Because rape was
not considered a war crime at the time of the Second World War,
military commanders who failed to prevent rape were not in
violation of international law.86 Shortly after the Second World
War, feminist activists began using the women's human rights
forum to propose international protections for women in times of
87
war.
The first attempts to specifically outlaw rape in international
law were not made until 1949.88 Article 27(2) of the Fourth
Geneva Convention 89 states, in relevant part: "[w]omen shall be
especially protected against any attack of their honour, in
particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of
indecent assault."90 The broad scope of Article 27(2) is misleading,
however, as women were protected only against the actions of
enemy forces. 91 There was no protection against rape under this
Article from a woman's own nationals or nationals of a neutral
state.92 It was not until 1977 that a comprehensive treaty
prohibiting rape in all situations of armed conflict was

84. While 20,000 to 70,000 women were raped in the former Yugoslavia,
500,000 women are raped each year in the United States. See ENSLER, supra note
2, at 54.
85. See Judith Gail Gardam, The Law of Armed Conflict: A Gendered Regime?,
in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 171, 177-78 (Dorinda

G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993).

86. See id.
87. See id.; see also Paul Rodgers, International Women Are Taking Rightful
Place at Peace Table, WOMEN'S ENEWS (July 29, 2001) (chronicling recent history of
women
activists'
responses
to
war),
at
http://www.womensenews.com/article.cfm/dyn/aid/158/context/cover).

88. See Gardam, supra note 85, at 178. For a more comprehensive list of
international documents barring sexual assaults against women, see infra note 98.
89. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Oct. 21, 1950, art. 27(2), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 287.
90. Id.
91. See Gardam, supra note 85, at 178.
92. See id.
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implemented. 93 The drafting of laws and standards protecting
women from sexual violence was a necessary step toward
including women in the international public discourse about
violence and safety.
Many organizations and governments now recognize that
rape may be used as an instrument of war and a method of ethnic
cleansing "intended to humiliate, shame, degrade and terrify the
entire ethnic group." 94 Professor MacKinnon, co-counsel for the
Kadic plaintiffs, describes this systematic sexual violence:
What this is-and this particularly invokes the international
legal context-is rape under orders. It is not rape out of
control. It is rape under control. It is also rape unto death,
rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make victims wish they
were dead. It is rape as an instrument of forced exile, to make
you leave your home and never want to come back. It is also
rape to be seen and heard by others: rape orchestrated as
spectacle. It is rape to shatter a people and to drive a wedge
through a community. It is the rape of misogyny liberated by
and unleashed by official command. It is rape as
xenophobia
95
genocide.
Rape of civilians during armed conflict has just recently been
The United Nations has
prohibited by the laws of war. 96
repeatedly affirmed, both explicitly and implicitly since the time of
the Geneva Conventions, 97 that sexual violence against women

93. See id. (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 76, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 38-39, which expanded the
protections offered by the Fourth Convention, such that "[w]omen shall be the
object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced
prostitution and any other form of indecent assault.").
94. Chinkin, supra note 4, at 329 (quoting Tadeusc Mazowiecki, Report
Pursuant to Commission Resolution: 1992/s-i/I of 14 August 1992: Report of
Special Rapporteurof the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50
(1993)).
95. MacKinnon, supra note 81, at 88.
96. See infra note 98 and accompanying text; supra note 93 and accompanying
text.
Geneva
97. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 were the following:
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
These four
U.N.T.S. 287. See WEISSBRODr ET AL., supra note 77, at 21.
conventions will hereinafter be referred to, respectively, as Geneva Conventions I,
II, III, and IV. These conventions are "[t]he principal multilateral treaties that
legislate international humanitarian law." Id.
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during times of armed conflict and war is prohibited. 98 This
international governmental recognition of the terrors of sexual
violence against women is vital to the creation of a type of warstate in which civilians are not attacked and, if they are, the
individual attackers and orchestrators of such attacks may be
brought to justice.
While the creation of international laws and standards
protecting women from sexual violence during times of conflict is a
step forward, selective enforcement of those international human
rights standards remains a barrier to the international eradication
of violence against women. 99 Despite the large scale of rape
perpetrated during war, the offenses are rarely taken seriously. 100
MacKinnon notes:
Whether or not they [sexually violent acts against women
during times of war or armed conflict] are prohibited on their
face, however, these practices are nonetheless widely
permitted as the liberties of their perpetrators, or excesses of
passion, or spoils of victory, or products of war. Virtually
nothing is done about them, within any nation or among
nations. They tend to be legally rationalized, officially winked
at, or in 01some instances even formally condoned. They are
ignored.1

98. Many different U.N. documents reflect the official international stance on
the issue of violence against women during times of war and conflict. For
examples, see WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 77, at 781-87 (citing Geneva
Conventions of 1949, Conventions I-IV, supra note 97 (describing as prohibited acts
towards people not actively involved in the hostilities: "(a) violence to life and
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
[and] ... (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment."); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, art. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 612, listing
"outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault!';
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 7, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 175, stating that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"; Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, art. 6, 1249 U.N.T.S.
13, 17, stating that states agree to take measures, including enacting legislation to
"suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women";
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 104, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/48/629 (1993) defining "violence against
women" generally and explicitly to include "(b) [p]hysical, sexual and psychological
violence occurring within the general community, including rape [and] sexual
abuse ... ; (c) [p]hysical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated and
condoned by the state, wherever it occurs").
99. See generally Gardam, supra note 85 (discussing the gendered nature of the
law of armed conflict).
100. See id. at 184.
101. MacKinnon, supra note 81, at 86.
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In addition to blatant disregard for international laws protecting
women during times of armed conflict, proper resources are not
The international
available for effective enforcement.10 2
instruments dealing specifically with women are often underand
resourced and have weaker implementation obligations
10 3
procedures than those dealing with the general public.
Now that de jure protections of women from sexual violence
during armed conflict are in place, those laws must be recognized
and enforced. The Kadic civil action accomplished this ideal by
holding Karadzic accountable for orchestrating genocidal rape
against Bosnian women.
III. Federal Jurisdiction over International Torts:
Precedents that Paved the Way for the Kadic Action
Kadic may seem an enigma to people unfamiliar with U.S.
international law because none of the parties involved were
citizens or permanent residents of the United States.
Developments in U.S. law allow non-citizens to sue a non-citizen
for civil damages in federal court, opening the doorway for Kadic
04
and for future cases against human rights offenders.
A. The Alien Tort Claims Act
The civil actions against Radovan Karadzic were brought
pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).105 Enacted as part
of the Judiciary Act of 1789,106 the ATCA was, until recently,
rarely invoked. 10 7 The ATCA provides, "[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.'108
102. See id. at 89.
103. See id.
104. See infra notes 105-134 and accompanying text.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
106. See WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 77, at 763.
107. See Theodore R. Posner, Alien Tort Claims Act-Genocide-War CrimesViolations of International Law by Nonstate Actors, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 658, 659
(1996).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The reasons for the ATCA's inclusion as part of the 1789
Judiciary Act are unclear. See Joan Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien Tort
Claims Act of 1789: Lessons from In Re Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 67 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 491, 492 (1993). Congress may have intended to provide uniformity
in the application of international norms by allowing federal courts jurisdiction
over alien tort claims, as suggested by the Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964). Other sources have asserted that
Congress may have believed that it was the responsibility of the United States, as a
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The ATCA was infrequently invoked until the 1980s, when
an increasing number of attorneys versed in international law,
combined with growing public interest in protecting international
human rights, paved the way for a revival of the statute. 0 9
Filartiga v. Peha-Irala110 is the landmark decision that
resurrected the ATCA.111
B. Filartiga and the Law of Nations
Filartigacame to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
on appeal by the plaintiffs after the district court dismissed their
112
wrongful death action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Filartigas alleged that Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year-old son,
Joelito, was abducted and tortured to death by Americo Norberto
Pefia-Irala, the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay,
in retaliation for Dr. Filartiga's political activities opposing the
Paraguayan President. 113 Upon learning that Pefia-Irala was in
the United States, the Filartigas filed a civil action against him in
114
U.S. district court, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
The district court dismissed the action on jurisdictional
grounds. 115 It ruled that the scope of the law of nations, as
adopted by the ATCA, was too narrow to include a state's
treatment of its own citizens. 116 However, the Second Circuit
disagreed and found that the district court had subject-matter
jurisdiction under the ATCA.117 The court based its decision on its
member of the world community, to provide an alien tort remedy. See, e.g., AnneMarie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 475-80 (1989).
109. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 108, at 493.
110. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
111. See WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 77, at 764 ("The Second Circuit's
decision in Filartigav. Peha-Irala... paved the way for many subsequent suits to
compensate victims for violations of international law.").
112. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 876. Plaintiffs Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter
Dolly were citizens of Paraguay at the time the action commenced, but Dolly was
present in the United States under a visitor's visa and had applied for political
asylum. See id. at 878.
113. See id. at 878. Plaintiffs also alleged that Dolly was forced to view the body
of her murdered brother and was told, "here you have what you have been looking
for for so long and what you deserve." Id.
114. See id. at 879. Dr. Filartiga also filed a criminal action in Paraguay against
Peiia-Irala and the Paraguayan police. See id. at 878.
115. See id. at 876. The decision to dismiss was based upon dicta in earlier
decisions that construed the law of nations narrowly under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, so as
to not include a foreign state's treatment of its own citizens. See Filartiga,630
F.2d at 879-80.
116. See id. at 880.
117. See id.
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interpretation of the law of nations, and found that torture by a
state official against a country's own citizens "violate[s]
established norms of the international law of human rights, and
hence the law of nations."118 Upon examination of various sources
of international law and historical and contemporary prescriptions
of the law of nations, the Second Circuit concluded, "official torture
is now prohibited by the law of nations." 119 Before the Filartiga
decision, the concept of state sovereignty controlled the law of
nations, such that a state could not be held accountable for
treatment of its own citizens. 120
Defining the law of nations is central to the interpretation of
the ATCA and what is considered torture. 12 1 The law of nations
can be characterized in three ways: (1) international custom; (2)
general principles of law recognized by civilian nations; or (3)
judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations. 122 Customary norms typically
reflect the general practice of governments that are accepted as
law. 23 The Supreme Court of the United States spoke on the
evolution of the customary law of nations at the turn of the
24
where it
twentieth century in its decision The Paqete Habana,1
that:
asserted
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years
of labor, research and experience, have made themselves
peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for
the speculations of their authors concerning what the law
ought to 1 25
be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law
really is.

118. Id.
119. Id. at 884.
120. Id. at 876.
121. See, e.g., id. Had the Second Circuit not adopted a definition of "law of
nations" different from that of the district court, there would have been no basis for
reversal of the district court's dismissal. See id.
122. See WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 77, at 768 (citing Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice).
123. See generally Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge:
Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 554-58 (1986) (explaining
the evolution of customary norms from existing laws).
124. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
125. Id. at 677. This section of The Paquete Habana opinion was also cited by
the Second Circuit as support for its interpretation of the meaning of the "law of
nations" in Filartiga.Filartiga,630 F.2d at 880.
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Relying on this evolutionary conception of international law, the
Filartigacourt determined, "it is clear that courts must interpret
international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and
126
exists among the nations of the world today."'
The Filartiga court also held that the ATCA may grant
subject-matter jurisdiction where a state's treatment of its own
citizens is involved. 127 This district court decision was based upon
the United Nations Charter, 128 which provides:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and wellbeing which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations ...

the United Nations shall promote ...

universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedom for129all without distinctions as to race,
sex, language or religion.
The Second Circuit also cited the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights" 30 and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Being Subjected to Torture"' as support for the conclusion that
"official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations," and that
"the prohibition is clear and unambiguous, and admits of no
distinction between treatment of aliens and citizens." 132 In a bold
statement to the world, the Second Circuit proclaimed:
The treaties and accords cited above, as well as the express
foreign policy of our own government, all make it clear that
international law confers fundamental rights upon all people
vis-A-vis their own governments. While the ultimate scope of
those rights will be a subject for continuing refinement and
elaboration, we hold
that the right to be free from torture is
133
now among them.

126. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881.
127. See id. at 876.
128. See id. at 881 (citing U.N. CHARTER). The United Nations Charter was
developed in the 1940s to establish human rights as an object of international
concern, as set forth in the International Bill of Human Rights. See WEISSBRODT
ET AL., supra note 77, at 1-31.
129. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
130. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 882 ("mhe Universal Declaration of Human
Rights .. . states in the plainest of terms, 'no one shall be subjected to torture."'
(quoting UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 5, U.N. Doc.
A/810,
at
71
(1948),
available
at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/hldpast.htm)).
131. See id. 882-83 ("The Declaration expressly prohibits any state from
permitting the dastardly and totally inhuman act of torture." (construing
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452,
U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, art. 3, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrtshnstree/hldpast.htm)).
132. Id. at 884.
133. Id. at 884-85.
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The Second Circuit's articulation of the law of nations was crucial
to its decision that the ATCA may provide subject-matter
jurisdiction where plaintiffs challenge their own sovereign's
actions. This extension of the ATCA was an essential step in the
expansion of the protections against torture, which now include
13 4
protection from organized sexual violence against women.
IV. The Significance of Kadic v. Karadzic in the Evolution
of Women's Human Rights
A.

Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia

Before discussing the specific ATCA claims brought against
Radovan Karadzic, it is necessary to provide background to
Karadzic's role in the conflict. Six republics now comprise the
former Yugoslavia:
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. 13 5
In 1991, Croatia and
Slovenia each declared independence. 136 The federal government
of Yugoslavia, located in what is now Serbia, responded by sending
troops to those areas, which sparked fighting that spread to
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 137
After Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its
independence at the end of 1991, armed conflict quickly spread.138
Between 1990 and 1992, three nationalist parties in BosniaHerzegovina, the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and the Serbian Democratic
Party (SDS),139 governed in a partnership under Muslim President
Alija Izetbegovic. 140 At that time, Karadzic was the leader of the
SDS.141 Disagreements between the parties as to whether BosniaHerzegovina should secede or remain part of Yugoslavia caused a
rift between the SDS (favoring remaining part of Yugoslavia) and
142
the HDZ and SDA (favoring independence).

134. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
135. See FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 500 (2d ed. 1996).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 501.
140. See Mark Danner, The Horrors of a Camp Called Omarska and the Serb
Strategy, in FRONTLINE ONLINE: THE WORLD'S MOST WANTED MAN, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/atrocities/omarska2.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
141. See CNN, Transcript of Interview with Karadzic (Nov. 28, 1995), at
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/nov95/11-28/karadzic/transcript.html.
142. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 135, at 501.
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In January of 1992, SDS leaders created their own Serbian
entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Srpska, of
which Karadzic declared himself president. 143
Paramilitary
supporters of the SDS, under Karadzic's control, began a
systematic attack of the surrounding areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro with the specific objective of
creating an ethnically pure "greater Serbia." 144 Non-Serbs in those
areas were targeted for extermination. 145 One of the main tactics
used to forward the Serbian genocide 146 of non-Serbs was the
147
systematic rape and sexual torture of non-Serbian women.
Radovan Karadzic, as the President of Srpska, played an
unquestionably decisive role in the development and realization of
this plan of ethnic cleansing. 48

143. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 192 F.R.D. 133, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
144.

NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 135, at 501.

145. Karadzic and his forces primarily targeted Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
Croat people. See Indictment, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Radovan
Karadzic, IT-95-5 (U.N. Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 24, 1995),
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kar-ii950724e.htm;
Indictment,
The
Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Radovan Karadzic, IT-95-18 (U.N. Inel Crim.
Trib.
for
the
former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
16,
1995),
http://www.un.org/icty/indictmentlenglish/kar-ii951116e.htm.
146. Genocide is defined as
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing
members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e)
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 6, 37 I.L.M.
999, 1004.
147. See Danner, supra note 140 ('Rather than being a regrettable but
unavoidable concomitant of combat, rapes and mass executions and mutilations
here served as an essential part of it.").
148. "'Ethnic cleansing' means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by
using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area."
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780
(1992), Final Report, 49th Sess., at 33, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994). U.N. experts
found the Bosnian government undertook a plan of "ethnic cleansing":
On the basis of the information gathered, examined and analysed, the
Commission of experts has concluded that grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law have
been committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia on a large scale,
and were particularly brutal and ferocious in their execution. The practice
of so-called "ethnic cleansing" and rape and sexual assault, in particular,
have been carried out by some of the parties so systematically that they
strongly appear to be the product of a policy, which may also be inferred
from the consistent failure to prevent the commission of such crimes and to
prosecute and punish their perpetrators.
NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 135, at 501-02 n.3 (citing Boutros BoutrosGhali, Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General to the Presidentof the
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B. Civil Actions Against Radovan Karadzic

In 1993, two related ATCA actions were filed against
Radovan Karadzic in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.1 49
The plaintiffs in Doe v.
0
Karadzic,15
Jane Doe I and Jane Doe II, alleged multiple human
rights violations by Bosnian-Serb forces. 151 Plaintiffs in Kadic v.
Karadzic152 were S. Kadic 153 and two women's organizations,
Internacionala Iniciative Zena Bosne I Hercegovine (Biser) and
Zene Bosne I Hercegovine. 154 The Kadic plaintiffs restricted their
allegations to crimes against women, including enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, rape, extrajudicial killing, and
other torture. 155 While the Doe and Kadic actions are similar, this
Note focuses on the Kadic action because of its significance to the
156
enforcement of women's human rights standards.
Security Council, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994)).
149. See Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 24, 1993); Kadic
v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 24, 1993). Many of the
proceedings for these two actions were combined, and both the courts and
academics have used their names interchangeably. Thus, many of the Kadic
citations will be to Doe v.Karadzic,and vice versa.
150. 866 F. Supp. 734 (No. 93 Civ. 0878) (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
151. See Michele Brandt, Doe v. Karadzic: Redressing Non-State Acts of GenderSpecific Abuse Under the Alien Tort Statute, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1413, 1413-14 (1995)
(citing plaintiff Does' Complaint). Brandt describes events surrounding the Doe
plaintiffs' claim:
Jane Doe I attempted to resist and she was beaten and forcibly held down.
She fainted.
Another soldier was raping her when she regained
consciousness.... After the soldiers raped Jane Doe II's mother, they took
her mother down the hallway and the children heard their mother scream.
The soldiers returned with a bloody knife and threatened to rape Jane Doe
II.
Id. at 1413-14 n.3, n.4 (quoting plaintiff Does' Complaint at 6).
152. 866 F. Supp 734 (No. 93 Civ. 1163) (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
153. S. Kadic was a plaintiff on her own behalf and on behalf of her two infant
sons, Benjamin and Ongen. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 734. Kadic was
forced to witness the murder of one of her sons, as alleged in the plaintiffs' claim:
[S. Kadic] approached the entrance to her home and was accosted by four
Serbian soldiers.... One told her that he had come "to take one of your
children so that you remember well what we chetniks know how to do."
The soldiers attempted to forcibly remove Ks son from her arms. She
resisted. She heard her son scream and looked down to see his head
resting on the floor in a puddle of blood. The rest of her son's body
remained cradled in her arms.
Brandt, supra note 151, at 1413 n.1 (quoting plaintiff Kadic's Complaint at 7).
154. See Kadic, 866 F. Supp. at 734.
155. See Yolanda S. Wu, Genocidal Rape in Bosnia: Redress in United States
Courts Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 101, 107 (1993).
156. In many ways the Doe and Kadic actions are inseparable. Many of the
court proceedings for the two cases were combined, and at one time the two were
joined as a class action. However, after the Kadic plaintiffs were granted their
motion to decertify the plaintiff class, the two actions were severed and pursued
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The procedural history of the Kadic action is long and
complex. 157 Initially, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. 158 While the district court came to the conclusion that
personal jurisdiction over Karadzic was not barred by any head-ofstate 159 immunity claimed by Karadzic, the decision that Karadzic
was not a head-of-state was the main factor in the dismissal for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATCA and the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 160 which at the time applied
only to state actors. By the district court's reasoning, it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction whether or not Karadzic was a head-ofstate.
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),161
foreign heads-of-state are often granted immunity from civil suit
in the United States. 162 Conversely, since Filartiga,torts have
been actionable under the ATCA only when committed under the
color of state law. 163 In Filartiga,the Second Circuit found that
"only conduct which rises to the level of an 'international common
law tort' by violating universally accepted standards of human
rights is within the law of nations, and thus within the subject'
The district court in Kadic
matter jurisdiction [of the ATCA]. "164

independently. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 192 F.R.D. 133 (2000). While the Kadic
action has reached resolution, the Doe proceedings are still taking place in the

Southern District of New York.
157. For the full procedural history, see supra note 16.
158. See Kadic, 866 F. Supp. at 736. Karadzic moved to dismiss pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), (4), (5), and (6), arguing lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of service of process, and
nonjusticiability. Id.
159. The district court in this case did not recognize Karadzic as a head-of-state
because the government he purported to head was not internationally recognized.
See id. at 737-38. "Karadzic's present lack of head-of-state immunity is conditioned
upon a decision of the Executive Branch not to recognize a Bosnian-Serb nation and
not to acknowledge Karadzic as an official head-of-state." Id.
160. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1994)). The TVPA provides a private right of action against "[ain individual who,
under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation" subjects
another person to torture or extrajudicial killing. Id. Plaintiffs against Karadzic
originally sought subject-matter jurisdiction under, inter alia, the TVPA_ See
Kadic, 866 F. Supp. at 738.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994).
162. Foreign sovereign immunity is derived from case law as well: "A head-ofstate recognized by the United States government is absolutely immune from
personal jurisdiction in United States courts. " Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp.
128, 131-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
163. See Kadic, 866 F. Supp. at 739 n.8.
164. Id. at 738-39 (citing Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir.
1980)).
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reaffirmed the Filartiga holding that to fall within the "law of
nations," the tort in question must have been committed under the
color of state law. 165 In explaining its reasoning, the district court
cited a California district court case which held that "purely
private torture will not normally implicate the law of nations,
since there is currently no international consensus regarding
torture practiced by non-state actors."'166 Thus, because Karadzic
was not an official head-of-state, he could not violate the law of
nations, and therefore could not be held to the standards of the
ATCA or the TVPA. Ironically, if Karadzic was determined to be a
head-of-state and subject to jurisdiction under the ATCA or the
TVPA, he may have been granted immunity from personal
167
jurisdiction under the FSIA.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal, finding that subject-matter jurisdiction
was proper under the ATCA.168 The Second Circuit based its
determination on whether plaintiffs pled a violation of the law of
nations, which is the third prong needed to invoke ATCA
jurisdiction.16 9 The court settled on the following standard to
determine if ATCA jurisdiction was proper: "If this inquiry
discloses that the defendant's alleged conduct violates 'well170
established, universally recognized norms of international law,'
'171
then federal jurisdiction
as opposed to 'idiosyncratic legal rules,
72
exists under the Alien Tort Act."'

165. See id. at 740-41. For a discussion of "law of nations," see supra Part III.B.
The district court cited persuasive authorities that interpreted the ATCA as
applicable to heads-of-state only. See Kadic, 866 F. Supp. at 739-41. The court
relied on a Fifth Circuit case that held "the Alien Tort Statute does not confer
subject-matter jurisdiction over private parties who conspire in or aid and abet,
official acts of torture." Id. at 740 (quoting Carmichael v. United Technologies
Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988)).
166. Kadic, 866 F. Supp. at 740 (quoting Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp.
1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
167. Some examples of torts actionable under the ATCA, as listed by the district
court deciding Kadic are, "inter alia, torture, slave trade, and piracy [citing
Filartiga,630 F.2d at 890]; genocide and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
[citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)];
summary execution [citing Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541-42]; wrongful death (citing
Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 336 (11th Cir. 1992)]; and war crimes." Kadic,
866 F. Supp. at 738, n.8.
168. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d. Cir. 1995).
169. See id. at 238. The Second Circuit stated that three conditions must be
satisfied to invoke federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATCA (1) an alien
sues (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of nations. Id.
170. Id. (quoting Filartiga,630 F.2d at 888).
171. Id. (quoting Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881).
172. Id.
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The Second Circuit rejected the district court's assertion that

a law of nations violation must involve state actors, 173 citing as
analogies the international stance against piracy,174 the slave
trade, 175 and aircraft hijacking as offenses of universal concern for
which non-state actors may be held culpable. 176 The court also
based its decision on the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, which states in relevant part:
"Individuals may be held liable for offenses against international
law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide."'177 After reviewing
the relevant sources of United States and international law, the
court concluded that non-state actors may be held liable for their
78
actions under the law of nations.
After the Second Circuit concluded that federal subjectmatter jurisdiction existed, Karadzic contested the existence of
personal jurisdiction because of insufficient service. However,
because Karadzic was served in the state of New York, the Second
Circuit decided that the court could exercise personal jurisdiction
over him. 179 Upon deciding that subject-matter and personal
jurisdiction existed, 8 0 the case was remanded to the district court

173. See id. at 239.
174. See id. (citing as examples United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
161 (1820); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 196-97 (1820); The
Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (facsimile of 1st ed. 1765-1769, Univ.
of Chi. ed., 1979)).
175. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (citing M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 193 (1992)); see also Jordan Paust,
The Other Side of Right: PrivateDuties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 51 (1992).
176. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
177. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES pt. 2, introductory note (1986)).
178. See id. at 239.
We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era,
confines its reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of
conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting
under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals.
Id.
179. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5291, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22,
1996). On February 11, 1993, Jonathan Soroko attempted service on Karadzic in
the lobby of his New York hotel when Karadzic was visiting the United States. See
id. at *3. Karadzic was not immune from service as a U.N. representative because
the hotel in which he was served is outside the U.N. headquarters district. See id.
Soroko attempted to hand papers to Karadzic, but the service was intercepted by a
security agent. See id. Karadzic quickly moved away from Soroko, at which time
Soroko shouted to him, "You've been served." Id. at *4. Over Karadzic's objections,
the district court determined that service was sufficient, given the circumstances.
See id. at *6.
180. To summarize, the District Court for the Southern District of New York had
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8
and set for trial.'1

In February of 1997, Karadzic communicated to the court
he
found it impossible to contest the civil claims in the United
that
instructed his attorney not to participate in any further
and
States
proceedings. 182 Thus, a default judgment was entered in favor of
the plaintiffs with regard to liability. Damages became the only

personal jurisdiction over Karadzic because he was served in New York City, and
the Second Circuit found that service was sufficient. See supra note 179 and
accompanying text. The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this civil
action through the ATCA, which the Second Circuit expanded to include actions
committed by private citizens. See supra notes 168-178 and accompanying text.
Karadzic was not granted immunity from civil suit under the FSIA because the
district court determined he was not a head-of-state. See supra note 159 and
accompanying text.
Karadzic is currently using the same tactic he used with the New York federal
courts to claim that The Hague lacks jurisdiction regarding his criminal
indictments. See CNN, Karadzic Defiant Over U.N. Court (July 5, 2001), at
http://www.cnn.com/200l/WORLD/europe/07/O5bosnia.tribunal/index.html.
Karadzic has long been avoiding accountability to the international community,
saying:
If you give us good evidence, we will arrest ourselves and there are many
other Serbs that should not be arrested by the foreigners. We will try our
own criminals... if there's good evidence.... I think the whole matter
about this tribunal is a matter of political pressure. This is completely
unfounded.... This is a discriminatory court.
1995), at
28,
CNN, Transcript of Interview with Karadzic (Nov.
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/nov95/11-28/karadzictranscript.html.
Slobodan Milosevic is also using the same strategy as Karadzic, refusing to
recognize the jurisdiction or competence of The Hague war crimes tribunal. See
Jim Maceda, At The Hague, Let the Circus Begin, MSNBC (July 3, 2001), at
http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/595714.asp.
181. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232. Karadzic made several motions in an attempt to
dismiss the actions and to avoid making a personal appearance in the United
States. In November of 1995, Karadzic petitioned the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals for a rehearing of its decision granting jurisdiction, but was denied. See
Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996). Karadzic appealed the denial to the
Supreme Court of the United States. Pending the Supreme Court's decision on
certiorari, the Second Circuit found service was proper and that answer and
discovery should not wait for the Supreme Court decision. See Kadic v. Karadzic,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5291 (1996). The Supreme Court denied Karadzic's writ of
certiorari. See Karadzic v. Kadic, 518 U.S. 1005 (2000). The district court granted
the plaintiffs' motion requesting that Karadzic be ordered to be deposed in the
United States and that he supplement his sparse discovery responses. See Kadic v.
Karadzic, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073 (1997).
182. See Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Karadzic refused
personal appearances on the grounds that he contested both personal jurisdiction
and sufficiency of service. See id.
One reason for Karadzic's refusal to appear in the United States may be his
fear of capture to face indictments by the United Nations Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia. This fear is not unfounded, as Karadzic is among the world's
most wanted men. See FRONTLINE ONLINE: THE WORLD'S MOST WANTED MAN, at
(last visited Nov. 19,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pageslfrontline/showslkaradzic/
2001).
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remaining issue for resolution at trial.18 3
C. The Law Finally ProvidesRedress For Rape Survivors
The judgment against Karadzic would be impossible if the
proper legal precedents were not in place.
Filartiga was a
monumental precedent because it extended protection to a citizen
from her own state's actions.18 4 This finding was a significant and
necessary step to eradicating the belief that a state's treatment of
its own citizens is a "private" matter that concerns only that state.
The determination that the law of nations is a concept that
85
is
evolves and changes with our changing times and beliefs
significant given the legislative intent argument that opponents of
ATCA jurisdiction may make. Opponents may argue that the
ATCA framers could not have intended the ATCA to be used for
the purpose of seeking civil damages against perpetrators of
torture because, at the time of the ATCA's enactment, torture was
186
not prohibited by any settled rule of international law.
Recognition of the need to adapt old laws to modern times is
essential to breaking down the traditional distinction between
actions that are public and actions that are private, and therefore
outside the realm of traditional law.
The Second Circuit's holding that subject-matter jurisdiction
in the Kadic action existed under the ATCA is a significant
expansion of the scope of the ATCA.187 Karadzic is the first nonstate actor to be held accountable under the ATCA for actions
committed under his "private" control. By acknowledging that a
non-state "private" actor may be held responsible for individual
actions that violate international law, the Second Circuit took a
tremendous step forward in nullifying the distinction between
public and private actions. These legal strides go hand in hand
with the beliefs of society in general, which is beginning to

183. Another procedural issue the court decided was that of the genocide victims'
class status. See Doe, 176 F.R.D. at 458 (granting Doe plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, reserving the decision of whether or not members would be allowed to
opt out); Kadic v. Karadzic, 182 F.R.D. 424 (1998) (denying Kadic plaintiffs' motion
to opt out of the class); Kadic v. Karadzic, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24 (1999) (denying
Kadic plaintiffs' motion to reconsider); Kadic v. Karadzic, 192 F.R.D. 133 (2000)
(granting Kadic plaintiffs' motion to decertify the plaintiff class, allowing the two
actions to continue separately).
184. See supraPart III.B.
185. See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (discussing the
necessity for evolution in international law).
186. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
187. See supraPart IV.B.
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recognize that violence is never a private matter.
D. Bridging the Gap Between Public and Private
The international and U.S. legal communities are finally
catching on to what women have known for many years: rape is
torture and war against women. 8 8 Ask any woman who has
survived sexual violence about its effects and she will likely agree
that rape is a vicious crime against not just a woman's body, but
against her soul. A study of the after-effects of systematic rapes in
Bosnia illustrates that this trauma spreads from women to their

188. There are innumerable works by women describing the effects of rape that
destroy their very being. In 1998 Eve Ensler published THE VAGINA MONOLOGUES,
based on a series of candid interviews with women about their vaginas. ENSLER,
supra note 2. Many women told Ensler stories of sexual assault. See id. Ensler,
outraged that 20,000 to 70,000 women were being raped in the middle of Europe in
1993, spent two months in Croatia and Pakistan interviewing female Bosnian
refugees. See id. at 54. The following piece is based on Ensler's interviews with the
Bosnian women and was dedicated to them. See id. at 55. I include the entire
piece because it is a powerful and moving representation of the torture that is rape.
It is entitled "My Vagina Was My Village."
My vagina was green, water soft pink fields, cow mooing sun resting
sweet boyfriend touching lightly with soft piece of blond straw.
There is something between my legs. I do not know what it is. I do not
know where it is. I do not touch. Not now. Not anymore. Not since.
My vagina was chatty, can't wait, so much, so much saying, words
talking, can't quit trying, can't quit saying, oh yes, oh yes.
Not since I dream there's a dead animal sewn in down there with thick
black fishing line. And the bad dead animal smell cannot be removed.
And its throat is slit and it bleeds through all my summer dresses.
My vagina singing all girl songs, all goat bells ringing songs, all wild
autumn field songs, vagina songs, vagina home songs.
Not since the soldiers put a long thick rifle inside me. So cold, the steel
rod canceling my heart. Don't know whether they're going to fire it or shove
it through my spinning brain. Six of them, monstrous doctors with black
masks shoving bottles up me too. There were sticks, and the end of a
broom.
My vagina swimming river water, clean spilling water over sun-baked
stones over stone cit, cit stones over and over.
Not since I heard the skin tear and made lemon screeching sounds, not
since a piece of my vagina came off in my hand, a part of my lip, now one
side of the lip is completely gone.
My vagina. A live wet water village. My vagina my hometown.
Not since they took turns for seven days smelling like feces and smoked
meat, they left their dirty sperm inside of me. I became a river of poison
and pus and all the crops died, and the fish.
My vagina a live wet water village.
They invaded it. Butchered it and burned it down.
I do not touch now.
Do not visit.
I live someplace else now.
I don't know where that is.
Id. at 57-59.
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communities. 89 When so many individual women face the threat
of violence in their everyday lives, the threat becomes one not only
to the individual, but to women as a class. 190 The actions of
Serbian forces in the former Yugoslavia demonstrate the societal
knowledge of this fact.
During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the early
1990s, Serbian forces under Karadzic's control took rape to the
extreme, such that it can no longer be denied that systematic rape
constitutes violence against women as a class. Radovan Karadzic,
a psychiatrist with intricate knowledge of the devastating
individual and societal effects of rape, ordered Serbian troops to
use widespread rape and sexual torture as a tool of war and
genocide. 191
Rape is a crime unlike any other because of its power to
shame its victims into silence. Karadzic knew that the power of
rape is its ability to shame and, most importantly, to keep victims
isolated from one another. The consequence of rape is to make a
woman feel as if she is deviant, her experience is anomalous, and
she is alone when, in fact, millions of women are raped. The
private character of rape contributes to the division of women, so
that they do not recognize themselves as a class and the effects of
"individual" crimes are minimized. Karadzic's genocidal rape was
perfectly calculated. As a psychiatrist, he knew the consequences
of rape: how it destroys women, their relationships with others,
and, thereby, their entire communities. This is the exact effect he
intended. By targeting women through rape, Serbs were able to
slowly break down communities from the inside, using the shame,
isolation, and suspicion surrounding rape to "divide and conquer"
community members. If there were ever an example of the use of
rape as an attack against women as a class, it is the actions of the
Serbs under the control of Radovan Karadzic.
Serbian military and political leaders accepted Karadzic's
knowledge of the effects of sexual violence and enunciated ethnic
cleansing and genocide by implementing the rape of non-Serbian
women as an official policy. 192 The fact that almost one-fourth of
189. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
190. To clarify, in asserting that rape is a crime against women as a class, I am
not stating that when one woman is raped all women may join in a class action
against the perpetrator. This is a possibility to consider in the future, but is
beyond the scope of this Note.
191. See Smiley, supra note 6.
192. See ANDREA DWORKIN, Free Expression in Serbian Rape/Death Camps, in
LIFE AND DEATH, 73, 73 (1997) C'Serbian military policy has mandated the
systematic gang rape of Muslim and Croatian women and girls, their imprisonment
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the concentration camps set up throughout Bosnia were
specifically designated as rape camps illustrates this.193
The Serbian actions in the former Yugoslavia have received
unprecedented international attention. 194 For the first time, states
have taken steps to bring to justice criminals who have violated
international standards barring sexual violence against women
during times of armed conflict. 195 Serbian political and military
leaders have been indicted by the criminal tribunal at The Hague;
96
many are in custody, and convictions are starting to come in.1
Kadic v. Karadzic is the first civil action of its kind, holding a
private foreign citizen accountable for his systematic, savage
crimes against women outside of the United States. 97 Kadic v.
Karadzic has paved the way for other women to follow suit,
bringing to justice people who have for too long been able to rely

in schools, factories, motels, arenas, and concentration camps for ongoing serial
rape, rape followed by murder, sexual torture, and sexual slavery."). Dworkin, an
avid opponent of pornography, asserts that pornography was used to prepare
Serbian forces to commit sexual violence by dehumanizing their victims. She
writes:
The pornography was war propaganda that trained an army of rapists who
waited for permission to advance. An atavistic nationalism provided the
trigger and defined the targets-those women, not these women. The
sexuality of the men was organized into antagonism, superiority, and
hatred. The lessons had been learned-not an ideology but a way of being:
dehumanization of women; bigotry and aggression harnessed to destroying
the body of the enemy; invasion as a male right; women as a lower life
form.
Id. at 74-75.
193. See id. at 73.
194. See Gardam, supranote 85, at 185.
195. See id.
196. For updated information on indictments and prosecutions by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, see the United Nations
website for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at
http://www.un.org/icty/.
197. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the Kadic plaintiffs will ever see a penny
of their $745 million judgment. Karadzic, who has been in hiding since the end of
the Yugoslav conflict, has no plans of surrendering himself to the jurisdiction of the
District Court for the Southern District of New York or The Hague. See CNN,
at
2001),
8,
(Apr.
Surrender'
• 'No
Vows
Karadzic
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/04/O8lbosnia.karadziclindex.html.
Karadzic, however, denies he is hiding. See id. "I am not in hiding at all, my
people are hiding me. You can ask any Serb if he would betray Radovan
Karadzic.... I walk around normally, go to baptism ceremonies, associate with my
friends and my soldiers, I have recently been even in Sarajevo." Id. Many Serbians
are, indeed, in full support of Karadzic. See CNN, Serbs Rally for Wanted Karadzic
at
2001),
28,
(July
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/28/yugoslavia.karadziclindex.html.
Serbs recently rallying for Karadzic told reporters, "No roads will lead them to
Radovan. Every Serb house shall be his hiding place and every true Serb his ally."
Id. To many Serbs, Karadzic is a leader and a saint. See id.
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on the private nature of their crimes to avoid accountability. No

more.
This leads to the crux of the relationship between rape on the
individual level and rape on the level that constitutes genocide.
Without the more "private," "minor" offenses, genocidal rape could

not occur. 198 Unless it was socially acceptable to torture women
through various forms of sexual violence on a daily basis, whether

through harassment, battery, or rape, the genocidal versions of
those actions could not exist. The supposedly private nature of the
individual instances creates the veil of privacy covering acts that
are so obviously public-such as the many rape camps designed to
extinguish non-Serbian women.
It is significant that the civil actions against Karadzic were

at one time a class action by a class of women. When trying to
convey the horror of crimes against women, it is often useful to
analogize crimes against racial minorities. If an African-American
man is lynched, society knows he was lynched because he was
African-American, and it is considered a crime against all AfricanAmericans, as a class. Why then, do we assume that a rape
against a woman is an individual, "private" incident? Rape is a
crime against all women, as a class. The Kadic civil action
recognizes and tells the world that "private" violence against
women is a public act of violence against women as a class, and
will not be tolerated by the international community.
V. Conclusion
The Kadic action makes the international community face

what women have known for some time:
[W]omen have gained political consciousness about gender
oppression by examining their personal lives. They have
realized that what happens in the intimacy of their own homes
is not exempt from the political forces that affect the rest of
society. The contemporary notion that 'the personal is
political' identifies and rejects the public/private distinction as
a tool by which women are excluded from public participation
while the daily tyrannies of men are protected from public
scrutiny. 199

Innumerable women face sexual violence.
Long considered a
private issue, not to be touched by the law, those women were
198. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
199. Aida Hurtado, Relating to Privilege: Seduction and Rejection in the
Subordination of White Women and Women of Color, in THEORIZING FEMINISM:
PARALLEL TRENDS IN THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 136, 144-45 (Anne C.
Herrmann & Abigail J. Stewart eds., 1995).
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offered no societal support in their quest to end the violence.
Indeed, women survivors have even been denied the support of
other women by the societal fragmentation of women as a class.
The civil actions against Radovan Karadzic are a declaration to
the world that violence against women is violence against women
as a class, and it will not be tolerated.
While Kadic is a significant advance in women's human
rights, much is left to be done. We must continue to break down
the public/private dichotomy, so that all women have an adequate
remedy, whether they are survivors of genocidal rape on the street
or marital rape in the bedroom. It is a step forward for the sexual
violence against women in the former Yugoslavia to receive
extensive political and media attention. Citizens of the world are
outraged at the atrocities committed against women in the name
of war. People take notice when families are thrown into camps;
when mothers watch as their children are murdered before their
eyes; when fathers are forced to rape daughters or face death;
when young girls are prostituted and raped with brooms, bottles,
sticks, by soldier after dirty soldier; when every person in a
community is suffering such a degree of trauma and loss that it
cannot be ignored.
The international attention begs the question:
why are
people not outraged at the number of women that are raped
around the world even during times of "peace"? Every year
500,000 women are raped in the United States. 20 0 There are more
rapes in the United States during times of peace than there were
during the duration of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and,
technically, we are not at war within our own society. People draw
an arbitrary line, as the law has, designating how much violence is
"acceptable." The effects are the same for every woman who is
raped, so what really is the difference? Both are shamed; both are
devastated; both lose trust in the people around them. Both face
the possibility of pregnancy, of sexually transmitted diseases and
infections, of nightmares, and terrifying body- memories. On a
personal level, "everyday" rape affects women just as much as
genocidal rape does. On a societal level, "everyday" rape affects
women just as much as genocidal rape does, but those effects are
dispersed and more difficult to recognize. Serbian troops were
ordered to rape to destroy communities.
Who is ordering
American men? The injustice of everyday rape should outrage the
media and the public as much as rape during war.

200. See ENSLER, supra note 2, at xxii.
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Perhaps Karadzic's actions were only recognized because
they took place in a pseudo-public realm. Kadic provides no new
remedy for women who are raped in their homes by their partners
or other family members. While Kadic did bring attention to the
widespread use of sexual violence as a weapon of war into the
public forum, it has not yet brought an understanding of rape as a
tactic of social control against women. It was unacceptable to put
Bosnian women in camps where they are brutally taken from their
families, raped, beaten, tortured, and forced to bear their enemies'
children. Every reasonable person accepts this fact. Now we must
look closely at our own communities. We must ensure that Kadic
is not seen in a vacuum: we must recognize that "everyday" rape
or "non-violent" date-rapes, in which physical violence is
purportedly not used but there was a simple "misunderstanding,"
is indeed violent and warrants the same national and
international attention. The Kadic decision is a significant step
towards the international recognition of rape, on both an
individual and societal level, as a crime with broad social effects
that demands immediate attention.

